Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Refining the Standard of Review by unknown
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 4 Article 4
1985
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards:
Refining the Standard of Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
(1985) "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Refining the Standard of Review," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 11: Iss. 4,
Article 4.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss4/4
NOTE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS:
REFINING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper standard of review of a labor arbitrator's award remains a signifi-
cant issue in federal labor law. This Note discusses the two existing standards,
the Enterprise Wheel standard and the standard set forth in section 10 of
the United States Arbitration Act, and concludes that the section 10 standard
better serves the public policy favoring labor arbitration by discouraging judi-
cial intervention in the arbitration process.
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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration allows the parties to a collective bargaining agreement
to resolve disputes during the term of the agreement without the
disruption caused by strikes.' The stability in labor relations due to
arbitration has resulted in a strong public policy favoring arbitra-
tion.2 This public policy appears in legislation,3 in decisions of the
1. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The
Lincoln Mills Court held for the first time that an arbitration clause was enforceable.
See id at 451. This holding established the importance of arbitration in resolving
labor-management disputes.
2. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960). See generally F. ELKOURI & E. EucouRi, How ARBrrRATION WORKS (3rd ed.
1973); 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed.
1983); M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION (1981); Kaden,Judges and
Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1980);
1
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United States Supreme Court,4 and in opinions of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.5 Despite this strong public policy, however, one
problem continues to plague the arbitration process: the standard
of judicial review of an arbitrator's award.6
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applies the standard of re-
view enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Enterprise
Wheel. 7 Enterprise Wheel states that the arbitrator's award is enforcea-
ble if it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.8
This standard continues to be applied by the Supreme Court and the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 9
Knight, Arbitration and Contract Interpretation: "Common Law" v. Strict Construction, 34
LAB. L.J. 714 (1983); Fourth Circuit Review, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459 (1983).
3. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (grievances to be resolved using method agreed to
by the parties to the agreement); id. § 185(a) (allowing courts to enforce collective
bargaining agreements by compelling arbitration). Judicial construction of 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) allows courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements by compelling ar-
bitration to which the parties have agreed. See also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-55.
4. See, e.g., Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596-97; Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363
U.S. at 577-78; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-68
(1960); Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-55.
5. See, e.g., Daniel Constr. Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
513, 738 F.2d 296, 301 (8th Cir. 1984); Kewanee Mach. Div. v. Local Union No. 21,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 593 F.2d 314, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1979); Resilient Floor & Dec-
orative Covering Workers, Local 1179 v. Welco Mfg. Co., 542 F.2d 1029, 1032 (8th
Cir. 1976); General Drivers, Local No. 120 v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 535 F.2d 1072,
1075 (8th Cir. 1976).
6. See Kaden, supra note 2, at 267-77 (discussing the conflict over interpretation
of the Enterprise Wheel standard and reviewing circuit applications); Markham,Judicial
Review of an Arbitrator's Award Under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
39 TENN. L. REV. 613, 616-31 (1972) (reviewing circuit decisions and commentators'
conflicts over proper application of the Enterprise Wheel standard).
7. 363 U.S. 593; see also Daniel Constr., 738 F.2d at 300; United Elec. Workers,
Local 1139 v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods., 728 F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1984)
(en banc); Riceland Foods, Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 2381, 737 F.2d
758, 759 (8th Cir. 1984); Zeviar v. Local No. 2747, Airline Employees, 733 F.2d 556,
559 (8th Cir. 1984); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 53 v. Sho-Me
Power Corp., 715 F.2d 1322, 1325 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1277 (1984);
St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis Theatrical Bhd. Local 6, 715 F.2d 405, 407 (8th
Cir. 1983); Lackawanna Leather Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l
Union No. 271, 706 F.2d 228, 230 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Vulcan-Hart Corp. v.
Stove Workers Int'l Union Local No. 110, 671 F.2d 1182, 1184 (8th Cir. 1982);
Carpenters' Dist. Council of Greater St. Louis v. Anderson, 619 F.2d 776, 778 (8th
Cir. 1980); Western Iowa Pork Co. v. National Bhd. of Packinghouse & Dairy Work-
ers, Local No. 52, 366 F.2d 275, 278 (8th Cir. 1966) (arbitrator must interpret and
apply collective bargaining agreement); Truck Drivers & Helpers Union Local 784 v.
Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 1964). For a discussion of the Enterprise
Wheel standard, see infra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
8. 363 U.S. at 597.
9. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Rubber Workers, 103 S.
Ct. 2177 (1983). In addition to applying the "draws its essence" language of Enter-
prise Wheel, the WR. Grace Court reminded courts not to overrule an arbitrator simply
[Vol. I11
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Despite the continued use of the Enterprise Wheel standard,
problems persist in its application.t0 To determine if an award
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, courts
must examine the pertinent portion of the collective bargaining
agreement and compare it to the arbitrator's award.t I This method
invites a review of the merits of the grievance or of the arbitrator's
award.12 Merit-based reviews are contrary to the stated policy of the
Supreme Court, however.' 3
An alternative to the present standard of review is provided by sec-
tion 10 of the United States Arbitration Act. 14 This standard pro-
vides for procedural review of the arbitration process, 15 as compared
to the meritorious review of the Enterprise Wheel standard.16 Like the
Enterprise Wheel standard,' 7 the Arbitration Act requires the arbitra-
tion award to be an interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement.' 8 While controversy exists regarding the ap-
plicability of the Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agree-
because a court's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement may be differ-
ent than the arbitrator's interpretation. Id. at 2182; see also Daniel Constr., 738 F.2d at
301; Litton, 728 F.2d at 971; Sho-Me Power Corp., 715 F.2d at 1326; Lackawanna Leather,
706 F.2d at 232.
10. See Kaden, supra note 2, at 270 (standard provides little guidance in reviewing
awards); Markham, supra note 6, at 619-31 (reviewing conflict among circuits in ap-
plying the standard); St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1137, 1148-49 (1977) (dis-
cussing additional tests applied with Enterprise Wheel standard).
11. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596-99; Daniel Constr., 738 F.2d at 298-301; Rice-
land Foods, 737 F.2d at 759-60; Litton, 728 F.2d at 971-72 (en banc) (adopting the
dissent of the Eighth Circuit panel decision, at 704 F.2d 393, 400-03); St. Louis Theat-
rical Co., 715 F.2d at 407-09; Lackawanna Leather, 706 F.2d at 230-32.
12. See Kaden, supra note 2, at 270-7 1; Markham, supra note 6, at 621-22. Profes-
sor Kaden stated:
Perhaps it is foolhardy to expect judges who daily interpret and apply
standards codified in contracts, regulations and statutes to stand aside and
enforce interpretations of collective bargaining agreements that seem to
them excessively far off the mark. In any event, it is apparent that this judi-
cial instinct will not be stifled by incantations of finality, or by still more
verbal formulations of the proper scope of review.
Id. at 274.
13. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596; American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568; see infra
notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
14. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
15. See Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516 UAW, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974); see
also Electronics Corp. v. International Union of Elec. Workers Local 272, 492 F.2d
1255 (1st Cir. 1974); Capital Dist. Chapter of N.Y. State, P.D.C.A. v. International
Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades, 581 F. Supp. 840 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). The Eighth
Circuit applied § 10(c) of the Arbitration Act in Grahams Serv. Inc. v. Teamsters
Local 975, but did not clearly adopt the Act. 700 F.2d 420, 422-24 (8th Cir. 1982).
16. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593.
17. See id. at 597.
18. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(d).
1985]
3
et al.: Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Refining the Standar
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
ments,' 9 the section 10 standard can be adopted without adopting
the entire Arbitration Act.20
This Note examines the two standards of judicial review of labor
arbitration decisions. The Note focuses on which standard best
serves the public policy supporting arbitration as the preferred
method of resolving labor disputes. The actions of the Supreme
Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals are explored, in addi-
tion to the public policy favoring labor arbitration. The Note con-
cludes that by adopting and applying the section 10 standard of
review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals will assure procedural
fairness in the arbitration process and avoid the problems inherent
in the Enterprise Wheel standard.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR ARBITRATION
A. The Enterprise Wheel Standard of Review
The Supreme Court squarely considered judicial review of an arbi-
trator's award for the first time in United States Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp. 2 1 According to the Court, an award is enforceable
if it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
22
19. See infra notes 93-115 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Signal-Stat Corp. v.
Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 911 (1957); Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d
85, 97-101 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Hoover Motor Express Co. v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 327, 217 F.2d 49, 52-53 (6th Cir. 1954); cf. Food Han-
dlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., 260 F.2d 835, 838 (8th Cir. 1958) (discussion of
the applicability of 9 U.S.C. § 4 to labor arbitration without discussing the language
of 9 U.S.C. § 1).
20. See Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln Mills Case, 42
MINN. L. REV. 333, 371-72 (1958); see also Grahams Serv. Inc., 700 F.2d at 422-23; infra
notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
21. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Enterprise Wheel, together with United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) and United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), form what is referred to as the Steelworkers
Trilogy. Markham, supra note 6, at 615. These cases establish the proper judicial
treatment of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Enterprise
Wheel dealt directly with judicial review of an arbitrator's award, 363 U.S. at 596,
while the other two cases in the trilogy dealt with the question of arbitrability. Amen-
can Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68; Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 577.
22. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collec-
tive bargaining areement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in
order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it
comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting
a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what
specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency. Never-
theless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the col-
lective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources,
yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collec-
[Vol. I11
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To satisfy this standard, the arbitrator must interpret and apply the
collective bargaining agreement. 23 If the arbitrator fails to stay
within these guidelines, he or she dispenses "industrial justice" and
the award is not enforced.24 In Enterprise Wheel, the Court compared
the collective bargaining agreement to the arbitrator's award to de-
termine if the award drew its essence from the agreement. 25
The Enterprise Wheel standard allows the arbitrator to go outside
the collective bargaining agreement in arriving at an award.26 The
arbitrator may consider the customs and practices of the particular
industry, in addition to the rules of the individual shop, to interpret
an agreement. 27 Statutory law may be considered if necessary.28
Despite the arbitrator's freedom to consider outside sources, the col-
lective bargaining agreement must remain the primary source of the
arbitrator's award. 29
tive bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidel-
ity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the
award.
Id. (emphasis added).
The draws its essence language did not immediately become the focal point, as
demonstrated by early Eighth Circuit decisions. See Kansas City Luggage & Novelty
Workers v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1964); Selb Mfg. Co. v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 305 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962).
23. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. In Enterprise Wheel, the Court required the
arbitrator to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement. Id. If the arbi-
trator fails to follow this requirement the arbitrator exceeds his or her authority. See
id. at 597-98. Thus, the Arbitration Act's provision for reversal if the arbitrator ex-
ceeds his or her authority can be interpreted to include the failure to base the award
on the collective bargaining agreement.
Satisfying the Enterprise Wheel standard appears to be especially difficult when it is
alleged that the arbitrator exceeded the authority conferred upon him or her by the
collective bargaining agreement. In this situation the authority of the arbitrator may
be limited by the agreement. See, e.g., St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d at 407-08. At
the same time, the clause is intended to be interpreted by the arbitrator. Thus, the
arbitrator is in the position to interpret his or her own grant of authority. The issue
is whether courts should defer to the arbitrator's interpretation of the clause, or
should fully explore its own interpretation of the limiting clause to determine if the
arbitrator exceeded his or her authority. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have taken the latter aproach.
See Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d at 759-60; St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d at 407-08. But
see Ozark Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 744 F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (8th
Cir.), reh'g granted, 744 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1984) (arbitrators allowed to interpret
ambiguous language regarding the appointment and role of a fifth arbitrator).
24. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
25. This may lead, however, to a review of the merits. See infra note 173 and
accompanying text.
26. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597; see also Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S.
at 581-82.
27. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582; see Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597
(arbitrator "may of course look for guidance from many sources").
28. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597-98.
29. Id. at 597.
19851
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The Enterprise Wheel Court cautioned lower courts to defer to the
arbitrator's ruling on the merits of the award.30 Reviewing courts
should assure that the award draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement, but should not review the arbitrator's inter-
pretation of the agreement. 3 ' In other words, if the award is based
on the collective bargaining agreement, the court must enforce the
award even if the court disagrees with the arbitrator's interpreta-
tion.32 According to the Court, the parties bargained for the arbitra-
tor's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, not the
court's. Courts may not overrule arbitrators simply because they dis-
agree on the merits. 33
Enterprise Wheel, together with its companion cases,34 expanded
and solidified the importance of arbitration in resolving labor dis-
putes.3 5 The Court described the collective bargaining agreement as
a form of "industrial self government."3 6 The collective bargaining
agreement provides the rules for that government's operation.37
Disagreements over interpretation of the rules are to be resolved by
the arbitrator.3 8 This makes arbitration, not judicial proceedings,
the forum for resolving grievances.39
B. Eighth Circuit Application of the Enterprise Wheel Standard
Following Enterprise Wheel, the Eighth Circuit compares the collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the arbitrator's award to determine if
the award draws its essence from the agreement. 40 If the award does
not meet this standard it is not enforced.41 It is unclear at what point
the arbitrator crosses the line from rendering an award that draws its
30. Id. at 596.
31. Id. at 599.
32. Id. at 596-97; WR. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 771 (1983).
33. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599.
34. American Mfg., 363 U.S. 564; Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574.
35. Fourth Circuit Review, supra note 2, at 790-92; see Markham, supra note 6, at
615.
36. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 580.
37. See id. at 581. "The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and
duties of the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. . . . The collective
agreement covers the whole employment relationship." Id. at 578-79 (footnote
omitted).
38. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599.
39. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-68; see Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at
581-82; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599.
40. See Daniel Constr. Co., 738 F.2d at 299-300; Zeviar, 733 F.2d at 558-59; Litton,
728 F.2d at 971; Sho-Me Power Corp., 715 F.2d at 1324-26; St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715
F.2d at 407-08; Lackawanna Leather Co., 706 F.2d at 230; Vulcan-Hart Corp., 671 F.2d at
1183-84; Carpenters Dist. Council, 619 F.2d at 778; Resilient Floor, 542 F.2d at 1032.
41. See, e.g., Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d at 759-60; St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d at
407.
[Vol. I11
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essence to dispensing industrial justice.42 The Enterprise Wheel Court
did not provide criteria for making this determination.43 The Eighth
Circuit's difficulty with making this determination is demonstrated by
two recent decisions.44
In Lackawanna Leather Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Inter-
national Union,45 an employee was discharged after receiving a writ-
ten notice of poor work performance. The employee had received
two prior notices, one for an unexcused absence and one for exces-
sive tardiness.46 Lackawanna Leather discharged the employee
under the collective bargaining agreement for receiving three writ-
ten notices within one year's time.47 The union contended that the
discharge was retaliatory,48 and initiated grievance proceedings.49
The arbitrator concluded that the poor work notice was justified,
but that the discharge was improper.50 The arbitrator interpreted
the discharge provisions of the collective bargaining agreement as
requiring three notices for the same offense.51 Thus, the company
could not discharge the employee without three violations of the
inefficiency provision.52 Since the two prior violations related to ab-
senteeism, the poor work notice was only a first notice under that
category.5 S
The Eighth Circuit panel stated that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority by interpreting the discharge provision,54 and reversed the
district court order enforcing the award.55 In submitting the issues
42. See, e.g., Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d 759-60; St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d at
407-09.
43. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597-99.
44. Litton, 728 F.2d 970; Lackawanna Leather, 706 F.2d 228.
45. 692 F.2d 536 (8th Cir.), vacated on reh'gen bane, 706 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982).
46. Lackawanna Leather, 692 F.2d at 537. According to the third written notice,
the employee had improperly operated a hide shaving machine at the company's
Omaha plant. Id
47. Id. Section 8.4 of the collective bargaining agreement stated, "An employee,
who during the course of a years [sic] period, receives three written notices in rela-
tion to inefficiency, absesteeism [sic], etc. shall be immediately discharged upon re-
ceipt of the third notice .. " Id.
48. Id. The union contended that the company's discharge of the employee was
due to his election to be laid off rather than use vacation during an inventory shut-
down. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 538.
51. Id.
52. See id. The arbitrator ordered the company to reinstate the employee but the
poor work notice was to remain in the employee's personnel file. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 539. Enterprise Wheel did not state that each particular clause of the
collective bargaining agreement had to be submitted for the arbitrator's considera-
tion before it could be applied by the arbitrator. See 363 U.S. 593.
55. 692 F.2d at 540.
1985]
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to be arbitrated, neither party indicated that the interpretation of the
discharge provision was an issue.56 Further, neither party offered ev-
idence during the hearing regarding the proper interpretation of the
provision.57 Relying on Enterprise Wheel, the court stated that the ar-
bitrator did not stay within the "areas marked out for his considera-
tion" when he interpreted the discharge provision.58 According to
the court, the arbitrator was not free to interpret the discharge clause
without hearing evidence regarding its proper interpretation.59 The
case was remanded to the district court with instructions to order the
reopening of the arbitration hearing to determine the proper inter-
pretation of the discharge provision.60
The Eighth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and concluded
that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by interpreting the
discharge provision.61 The court stated that the arbitrator could
consider the discharge provision, since discharge provisions are
common in collective bargaining agreements and must be inter-
preted in order to justify discharge. 62 In fact, Enterprise Wheel re-
quires the arbitrator to interpret and apply the collective bargaining
agreement. 63 According to the court, in the dicharge context the
employer carries the burden of proving that the agreement supports
the discharge. 64 This proof may include evidence of past practices
or other evidence indicating how the agreement is interpreted by the
parties.65 In Lackawanna Leather, the employer failed to introduce
56. Id. at 539.
57. Id. at 540. The court was concerned that allowing the arbitrator to interpret
the discharge clause without hearing evidence deprived the company of a fundamen-
tally fair hearing. See id. The review standards of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 10 (1982), are designed to grant a fundamentally fair hearing. See Bell Aero-
space, 500 F.2d at 923.
58. 692 F.2d at 540 (quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 598). In the panel opin-
ion, the union argued that Enterprise Wheel prohibits a court from substituting its judg-
ment for that of the arbitrator. Id.
59. See id. at 540.
60. Id. This is consistent with the action of the Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel,
363 U.S. at 599; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(e) (providing for rehearing by arbitrators if
award is vacated).
61. 706 F.2d at 231-32.
62. See id. at 231.
63. See 363 U.S. at 597.
64. See 706 F.2d at 231. Arbitration over employee discharge is an issue fre-
quently presented in the Eighth Circuit. See, e.g., Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d 758; St.
Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d 405; Grahams, 700 F.2d 420. An arbitrator's authority to
modify the employer's discipline is marked by a diversity of opinions. See M. HILL &
A. SINICROPI, supra note 2, at 97-105. Courts should, however, remember that Enter-
prise Wheel grants the arbitrator flexibility in formulating remedies as long as the rem-
edies are based on the collective bargaining agreement. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at
596-97.
65. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 580-81.
1000 [Vol. I11
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such evidence. 66 Since it was necessary for the arbitrator to interpret
the provision to reach a decision on the grievance, he was free to
give the clause its ordinary meaning.67
In United Electrical Workers, Local 1139 v. Litton Microwave Cooking
Products,6 8 the employer scheduled an inventory shutdown requiring
some employees to either use vacation time or take time off without
pay. The arbitrator concluded that Litton violated the collective bar-
gaining agreement by requiring employees to take vacation at a time
other than the summer months.69 The arbitrator ordered Litton to
grant an additional week of paid vacation to the affected
employees.70
On review, the Eighth Circuit panel held that the award was puni-
tive, 7' a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and based
on an unsupported factual assumption.72 The fundamental error in
the award, however, was its violation of express contractual provi-
sions. 73 The collective bargaining agreement provided for a gradu-
ated vacation schedule based on the number of years of service. 74
According to the court, by granting an additional week of paid vaca-
tion, the arbitrator modified the agreement.75 The agreement pro-
66. 706 F.2d at 231.
67. Id. The Eighth Circuit has stated that the arbitrator is allowed to resolve
certain issues not directly addressed in the collective bargaining agreement. See Rain-
bow Glass Co., 663 F.2d at 817 (silence of bargaining agreement creates ambiguity);
Welco Mfg. Co., 542 F.2d at 1033 (silence of bargaining agreement allows some discre-
tion). The dissent in the en banc Lackawanna Leather decision argued that the case
should have been reopened for further arbitration on the proper interpretation of
the discharge clause in the collective bargaining agreement. 706 F.2d at 235-36
(John Gibson, J., dissenting). The dissent was troubled by the court's refusal to re-
submit the case to arbitration and stated, "The sandbagging that occurred in this
case is simply a miscarriage ofjustice, and makes the arbitration proceeding in this
case a farce." Id.
68. 704 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1983).
69. Id. at 394-95.
70. Id. at 395.
71. Id. at 397-98; see M. HiLL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 2, at 4.
72. 704 F.2d at 396-97. The en banc majority adopted the reasoning of the
panel dissent. 728 F.2d at 972.
73. Litton, 704 F.2d at 399-400. Enterprise Wheel does not expressly provide
grounds for vacating an award that violates express contractual provisions. See 363
U.S. 593. The Litton panel decision stated that the number of days of vacation al-
lowed under the collective bargaining agreement was controlling because the sched-
ule was unambiguous. 704 F.2d at 399-400. The panel ignored the fact that the
arbitrator construed three clauses together and resolved the conflict by ruling that
the vacation season clause controlled. See id. at 400-01 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
74. 704 F.2d at 399.
75. See id. Clauses restricting the arbitrator's authority pose particular problems.
Four cases with subtle differences demonstrate this difficulty. In all four cases, the
collective bargaining agreement restricted the power of the arbitrator to alter the
terms. Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d at 760 ("arbitrator shall have no power to alter,
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hibited the arbitrator from modifying its terms.76
As in Lackawanna Leather, the Eighth Circuit granted a hearing en
banc.77 The court concluded that the arbitrator's remedy was based
on his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and that
the agreement was thus enforceable.78 The arbitrator was forced to
reconcile the conflict between the vacation season and vacation shut-
down schedule clauses. 79 The arbitrator concluded that the vacation
season clause made the shutdown, as scheduled by Litton, a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement.80 The arbitrator's remedy
was to award a week of vacation during the vacation season to the
affected employees.81 This award gave the employees who used va-
amend, change, add to, or subtract from any of the terms of this agreement"); St.
Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d at 407 ("Arbitrator ... shall have no right to alter,
amend, modify or change the terms or provisions of this Agreement"); Keewanee
Mach. Div., 593 F.2d at 316 ("arbitrator shall not add to or pubtract from, alter or
modify any provisions of this agreement"); Welco Mfg. Co., 542 F.2d at 1031 ("the
arbitrator ha[s] no authority to . . .change the provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement").
These four cases contained a restriction on the arbitrator's authority to alter the
discipline selected by management. Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d at 760 ("Any arbitration
• ..shall not include whether or not the type of discipline selected was appropri-
ate"); St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d at 408 ("Any employee violating this provision
may be disciplined or discharged and shall have no recourse to any other provisions
of this Agreement except as to the fact of participation"); Kewanee Mach. Div., 593
F.2d at 315 ("The Company retains the exclusive sole ... right to discharge employ-
ees"); Welco Mfg. Co., 542 F.2d at 1031 ("the arbitrator ha[s] no authority to ...
modify 'disciplinary action' ").
Despite the similarities in these cases, the results and rationale used by the
Eighth Circuit are vastly different. Compare Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d 758 (arbitrator's
decision unenforceable) and St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d 405 (arbitrator's decision
unenforceable) with Kewanee Mach. Div., 593 F.2d 314 (arbitrator's decision enforcea-
ble as part of collective bargaining agreement) and Welco Mfg. Co., 542 F.2d 1029
(enforcing arbitrator's decision).
76. Litton, 704 F.2d at 399.
77. Litton, 728 F.2d 970.
78. Id. at 972. The en banc dissent sharply disagreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that the award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. See id.
at 972-74 (John Gibson, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that Litton together with
Lackawanna Leather "effectively eliminates any judicial review over the concededly
broad powers of arbitrators." Id. at 974 (John Gibson, J., dissenting).
The circuitous routes taken to affirm the arbitrator and the sharp dissents in
Lackawanna Leather and Litton show how divided the court is over the proper applica-
tion of the Enterprise Wheel standard.
79. Litton, 704 F.2d at 400-01 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
80. Id. at 401. The en banc majority looked at the arbitrator's award only to
determine if the award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
at 395. The panel's majority opinion was highly critical of the arbitrator's award. See
id. at 396-97. The approach of the en banc Litton court is more consistent with Enter-
prise Wheel.
81. Id. at 395. The arbitrator directed that this extra week be a paid vacation. Id
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cation during the shutdown one more week of vacation than they
would have had otherwise.82 The court concluded that it may not
have awarded the same remedy as the arbitrator, but that the arbitra-
tor acted within his authority.83
The difficulty in determining the threshhold for the Enterprise Wheel
standard is illustrated by Lackawanna Leather and Litton. Decisions
frequently begin by stating that an award must draw its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement. 84 Occasionally, some language
limiting the arbitrator's authority is also introduced.85 The reason-
ing used by the court to determine whether the award draws its es-
sence, however, is difficult to discern.
Lackawanna Leather reveals another issue created by the Enterprise
Wheel standard. The court in Lackawanna Leather was concerned that
the parties may have had some agreed upon interpretation of the
discharge provision that was not presented to the arbitrator.86
Under Enterprise Wheel, the arbitrator may accept evidence of the par-
ties' understanding, but he or she is not required to do so.8 7 The
panel in Lackawanna Leather attempted to make this a requirement.88
On rehearing, however, the court disapproved this attempt.8 9
II. THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT
A. Background of the Arbitration Act
The United States Arbitration Act,90 enacted in 1925, 9 1 provides
another standard for judicial review of labor arbitration awards.92
82. Id. at 400-01 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Litton, 728 F.2d at 972.
84. See, e.g., Lackawanna Leather, 706 F.2d at 230; Litton, 704 F.2d at 395.
85. E.g., Litton, 704 F.2d at 395. "Judicial deference to arbitration, however,
does not grant carte blanche approval to any decision that an arbitrator might make."
Id.
86. See Lackawanna Leather, 692 F.2d at 540 (panel opinion).
87. Cf Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597 (arbitrator may consider many sources).
88. See Lackawanna Leather, 692 F.2d at 540.
89. See Lackawanna Leather, 706 F.2d at 231 ("without evidence as to the meaning
of the contract clause in question, an arbitrator may properly give that clause a read-
ing ordinary to similar labor contracts").
90. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
91. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14).
92. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)-(e) (1982). This section states:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party of the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators
or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
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The background of the Arbitration Act must be explored because of
the controversy surrounding its application to collective bargaining
agreements. The controversy centers on the exclusionary language
of section 1 of the Arbitration Act.9 3 This provision states that
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce." 94 Thus, the question remains
whether this language excludes collective bargaining agreements
from the provisions of the Arbitration Act.
9 5
The background of the Arbitration Act supports the theory that it
was enacted to enforce agreements to arbitrate in commercial con-
tracts.9 6 The common law rule which prohibited specific enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate labor disputes applied with equal
dence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discre-
tion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
The Arbitration Act also provides for modification and correction in section 11 which
states:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or cor-
recting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property
referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the
matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent
thereof and promote justice between the parties.
Id. § 11.
93. Id. § 1.
94. Id.
95. Compare Signal-Stat Corp., 235 F.2d at 302-03 (Arbitration Act applies to col-
lective bargaining agreements) and Hoover Motor Express, 217 F.2d at 53 (Arbitration
Act applicable to collective bargaining agreements) with Lincoln Mills v. Textile
Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 86 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 448 (1957)
(Arbitration Act not applicable to collective bargaining agreements) and United Elec.
Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (Arbitration
Act not applicable to collective bargaining agreements).
96. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1925). "This bill simply provides for one thing, and
that is to give an opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and
admiralty contracts-an agreement to arbitrate, when voluntarily placed in the docu-
ment by the parties to it." Id. (statement of Rep. Graham).
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force to commerical contracts.9 7 The need for an expedient method
of resolving commercial disputes resulted in the American Bar Asso-
ciation sponsoring the original bill.98 Although the bill did not con-
tain language including labor organizations, some unions opposed
its passage.9 9 The bill was reintroduced two years laterlOO with addi-
tional language excluding labor disputes from the Arbitration Act's
coverage. 101
Despite this history, circuit courts have posed several theories us-
ing section 1 as a rationale both for and against the application of the
Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agreements.10 2 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that collective bargaining agree-
ments are not contracts of employment, and are not excluded from
the provisions of the Arbitration Act.l03 The Second Circuit
adopted this reasoning, and stated that the Arbitration Act should be
interpreted to further the congressional goal that labor disputes be
arbitrated.t04 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits reached the opposite
result applying the same lanaguage. 105
A different view of the legislative intent was suggested by the ap-
pellant in Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills. 106 The union ar-
gued that Congress could not have intended to include or exclude
grievance arbitration in enacting the Arbitration Act.t0 7 The union
stated that labor arbitration did not come to connote grievance arbi-
97. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 (common law rule against enforcement of
executory agreements to arbitrate rejected by 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)).
98. See Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States
Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925).
99. See Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d 81; Brief for Respondent at 21, Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448.
100. Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 21-22.
101. See id. at 22.
102. See, e.g., General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d at 98.
Collective bargaining between an employer and the representatives of a
unit, usually a union, results in an accord as to terms which will govern hir-
ing and work and pay in that unit. The result is not, however, a contract of
employment except in rare cases; no one has a job by reason of it and no
obligation to any individual ordinarily comes into existence from it alone.
The negotiations between union and management result in what has often
been called a trade agreement, rather than in a contract of employment.
Id. (quotingJ.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1944)) (emphasis omitted).
103. Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 453-54 (3d Cir.
1953).
104. Signal-Stat, 235 F.2d at 302-03. The Signal-Stat court stated that in the face of
vague legislative history on the Arbitration Act, to exclude collective bargaining
agreements from coverage under the Arbitration Act would be contrary to legislative
intent. Id.
105. Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d at 86; Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d at 224.
106. See Brief for Appellant at 52-53, Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448. But see Brief for
Respondent, supra note 99, at 19-24.
107. Brief for Appellant, supra note 106, at 52-53. Despite these arguments the
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tration until the 1930's.108 Prior to that time, labor arbitration con-
sisted of arbitrating wage rates.' 0 9 Thus, the union argued,
grievance arbitration could not have been a consideration of Con-
gress when it enacted the Arbitration Act.t10
In Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court compelled arbitration based
on section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, rather than
the Arbitration Act."' The Lincoln Mills Court did not rule on the
applicability of the Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agree-
ments despite the opportunity to do so." 1 2 The Court deepened the
silence by deciding two companion cases to Lincoln Mills based on
section 301,113 although the lower court compelled arbitration based
on the Arbitration Act.'14 The Supreme Court affirmed both cases
and stated, "We follow in part a different path than the Court of
Appeals, though we reach the same result.' 15
B. The Section 10 Standard of Review
Despite the controversy surrounding the applicability of the entire
Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agreements, the section 10
review standard may be applied without adopting the entire Arbitra-
tion Act.116 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the
Court did not decide the Arbitration Act's applicability to collective bargaining
agreements. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 466 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
108. Brief for Appellant, supra note 106, at 52-53. See generally 0. FAIRWEATHER,
supra note 2, at 1 (procedural growth of arbitration in the 1930's).
109. Brief for Appellant, supra note 106, at 52-53.
110. Id. at 53.
111. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451-52. The Fifth Circuit in Lincoln Mills reviewed
the arguments regarding the applicability of the Arbitration Act to collective bargain-
ing agreements and concluded that collective bargaining agreements were contracts
of employment subject to exclusion under 9 U.S.C. § 1. Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d at 84-
86. In an article written after Lincoln Mills, but before Enterprise Wheel, Professor Pir-
sig suggested that the Arbitration Act could have been used by the Supreme Court in
Lincoln Mills to supplement its holding. Pirsig, supra note 20, at 371-72.
112. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 466 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. General Elec. Co., 353 U.S. 547; Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Work-
ers, 353 U.S. 550 (1957).
114. See Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 97
(1st Cir. 1956), afd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 233 F.2d at 106.
115. General Elec. Co., 353 U.S. at 548.
116. See generally General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard Brands
Inc., 579 F.2d 1282, 1294 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978) (reviewing recent Supreme Court deci-
sions and the responsive direction taken by the circuit courts). The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the question of applicability of the Arbitration Act
to collective bargaining agreements was not properly before them. Id. The Fifth
Circuit noted, however, that it had held the Arbitration Act applicable to disputes
over contracts of employment between a broker and the brokerage firm. Id.; see also
Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 638 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977). This action may
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section 10 standard of review in this way." i1 Before examining the
application of section 10 standards it is necessary to review its
elements.
Section 10(a) of the Arbitration Act provides for vacating an arbi-
tral award procured by corruption, fraud or undue means.' 18 Under
section 10(a), attempting to introduce prejudicial evidence is not
grounds for vacating an award if the arbitrator is not prejudiced.' 19
This section addresses misconduct by the parties, rather than the ar-
bitrator, which affects the arbitrator's award.120
Section 10(b) of the Arbitration Act provides for vacating an award
when the arbitrators themselves are guilty of corruption or evident
partiality.121 Arbitrators, selected for their knowledge of the indus-
try, may have limited business dealings with the principals in a dis-
pute.12 2 If these dealings are substantial the award may be
affected. 123
If the arbitrator refuses to postpone a hearing where sufficient
cause is shown or refuses to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy, a court may vacate the award pursuant to section
10(c).' 2 4 Under this section a party's rights must be prejudiced by
the error in order to remand the case.' 25 In reviewing the arbitra-
tor's evidentiary rulings, the court should not hold the arbitrator to
the same procedural standard as a federal judge.126 Instead, the ar-
signal the Fifth Circuit's receptiveness to the Arbitration Act's review standard if the
question is squarely presented.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also held the Arbitration Act applicable to
a contract between a broker and the brokerage firm. See Dickstein v. du Pont, 443
F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971). The First Circuit, relying on Tenney and Signal-Stat,
holds that the exclusionary language of 9 U.S.C. § 1 applies only to workers involved
in the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce. Id.
117. Grahams, 700 F.2d at 422.
118. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a); see supra note 92 (text of § 10(a)).
119. Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978).
120. See id at 352.
121. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b); supra note 92; see Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675
F.2d 1197, 1199-1202 (11 th Cir. 1982) (arbitrator's failure to disclose investigation
by Florida State Bar Association regarding trust account violations involving insurers
who were also parties to the arbitration evidenced partiality). But see Merit Ins. Co. v.
Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 676-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 529 (1983)
(previous relationship between arbitrator and party at a third company over 14 years
ago, where they had had little personal contact at that time and no contact since, was
not probative of evident partiality).
122. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S.
145, 146-49 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
123. See id. at 147. The Court stated that this problem could be overcome by the
arbitrator disclosing any relationship with a party. See id. at 149.
124. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c).
125. Id.
126. According to Judge Learned Hand,
Arbitration may or may not be a desirable substitute for trials in courts; as to
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bitrator should be required only to grant a fundamentally fair
hearing. 127
Section 10(d) provides for vacating an award when it is indefinite
or when the arbitrators exceed their powers.' 2 8 This section most
closely resembles the Enterprise Wheel standard 129 and may be applied
in similar situations. In addition, any ambiguity must be substantial
and affect the subject matter of the award.1so
Section 10(e) of the Arbitration Act allows the court to order a
new hearing when it has vacated the award.13t This provision allows
for errors in the arbitration proceedings. 3 2 Under certain circum-
stances, parts of the original hearing may be preserved to prevent
reintroduction of evidence.,33
that the parties must decide in each instance. But when they have adopted
it, they must be content with its informalities; they may not hedge it about
with those procedural limitations which it is precisely its purpose to avoid.
They must content themselves with looser approximations to the enforce-
ment of their rights than those that the law accords them, when they resort
to its machinery.
American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d
Cir. 1944).
127. See, e.g., Grahams, 700 F.2d at 422-23.
128. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d). Especially interesting is the result in Riceland Foods, 737
F.2d 758. The arbitrator determined the issue to be whether just cause existed for
the discharge, and if not, what was the proper remedy. See id. The arbitrator con-
cluded that Riceland had not established that the management directive in question
was fair, reasonable, and contractual. Id. The arbitrator ordered reinstatement, but
penalized the employees one month's pay for failing to "obey now, grieve later." Id.
The court focused on the section of the collective bargaining agreement that
stated that the arbitrator could only consider whether or not just cause was present.
Id. at 760. The section prohibited the arbitrator from considering whether or not the
type of discipline selected by the company was appropriate. Id. The court stated that
because the employees had violated the "obey now, grieve later" rule they had vio-
lated the collective bargaining agreement. Id. Once it was determined that the em-
ployees had violated the agreement, the arbitrator was precluded from considering
the appropriateness of the discipline. Id.
The court's analysis is questionable because it removes from the arbitrator the
power to determine the merits of the grievance. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596,
598-99 (stating that this power is the arbitrator's). The arbitrator concluded that the
employer's rule was not contractual, but because the employees' refusal to follow the
rule was unreasonable, they were penalized. Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d at 759-60.
Further, the arbitrator understood that his task was to consider ifjust cause was
present, and if not, determine what the remedy should be. See id. at 758-59. It is
reasonable to conclude that since the arbitrator ordered a remedy he did not find just
cause for discharge.
129. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
130. See Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d. at 923-24.
131. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(e).
132. See Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 924-25.
133. See, e.g., Reynolds Secs. Inc. v. Macquown, 459 F. Supp. 943, 944 (W.D. Pa.
1978) (arbitrators have right to reconsider entire decision).
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C. Section 10 Applied to Labor Arbitration
Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, UA W134 provides an example of how
to apply the section 10 standard of review to labor arbitration
awards. In Bell Aerospace, two unions and the company arbitrated to
clarify which employees should perform certain work for Bell.135
The arbitrator's first award was remanded by the district court for
clarification. 13 6 Although the second award was still contradictory, it
was enforced by the district court.'
3 7
On appeal, Bell alleged that the arbitrator rendered an ambiguous
award.138 Local 205's allegation of denial of a fair hearing was based
on the arbitrator's reference to an affidavit not placed into evi-
dence.13 9 In reviewing the arbitrator's use of the affidavit, the court
did not require the arbitrator to observe the procedures of a federal
court, but instead required that the arbitrator grant a fundamentally
fair hearing. 140 The court concluded that the arbitrator's reliance on
the affidavit did not deprive Local 205 of a fundamentally fair
hearing. 141
Next, the court evaluated the claim of Local 205 that the arbitrator
was guilty of evident partiality under section 10(b) of the Arbitration
Act. 14 2 The court stated that no evidence established partiality.14
3
According to the court, the only basis for Local 205's claim was that
the arbitrator's award favored the other union.
14 4
Finally, the court evaluated the award pursuant to section 10(d) of
the Arbitration Act to determine if the award was final, mutual, and
134. 500 F.2d 921 (1974).
135. Id. at 922.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 923.
139. Id. at 922-23. The district court found that the affidavit was part of the rec-
ord of an NLRB case which the parties had stipulated was relevant. Id. at 923.
140. Id.; see also Grahams, 700 F.2d at 423 & n.l.
141. Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923; see also Local Union No. 251 v. Narragansett
Improvement Co., 503 F.2d 309, 311-13 (1st Cir. 1974). In Narragansett, the com-
pany was aware of the insufficiency of its records regarding the employee's conduct.
The company also presented no evidence that witnesses were unavailable to appear
at the arbitration hearing. In this instance the arbitrator's refusal to delay the hear-
ing did not deprive the company of a fundamentally fair hearing. Id.
142. Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923.
143. Id. The arbitrator's duty is to disclose any dealing that might create an im-
pression of possible bias. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 149. Once the
arbitrator has complied with this requirement, a court's role in determining partiality
is significantly reduced since the parties have the opportunity to reject the arbitrator
prior to the hearing. See In re Sanko S.S. Co. & Cook Indus. Inc., 495 F.2d 1260,
1264 (2d Cir. 1973).
144. Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923.
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definite.145 The court held that the award was ambiguous on its face
and remanded the case to the district court for selection of a new
arbitrator, since the previous arbitrator was unable to render a defi-
nite award after two attempts.' 46 If the parties could not agree on a
new arbitrator, the district court was to appoint one.'
47
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied both the Enterprise
Wheel standard and the section 10 standard in Grahams Service Inc. v.
Teamsters Local 975. 148 In Grahams, an employee was discharged for
committing a major violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.149 The employee filed a grievance against Grahams.o50 The
arbitrator ruled that the company failed to prove that the employee
was guilty of a major violation warranting immediate discharge.'15
Since the employee was not guilty of a major violation, he could not
be discharged without a prior written warning.' 52 By discharging the
employee without giving the required warning, the company violated
the collective bargaining agreement.15
3
The company alleged that the arbitrator's refusal to consider evi-
dence of the employee's work record constituted misconduct by the
arbitrator.154 The arbitrator had excluded notarized letters pertain-
145. See id. To determine if the award is definite, the court is required to read and
analyze the award. In this respect it resembles the Enterprise Wheel test. The differ-
ence between Bell Aerospace and Enterprise Wheel is that under Bell Aerospace, a court
does not have to determine if the award draws its essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement. In other words, the entire award does not have to be free of ambigu-
ity, but a court must be able to find that the award is clear regarding the heart of the
dispute.
146. Id at 924-25.
147. Id. at 925.
148. 700 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1982). Although the court stated that its review was
limited to determining whether the award drew its essence from the collective bar-
gaining agreement, id. at 422, the court did not analyze how the misconduct fit into
the Enterprise Wheel standard.
149. Id. at 421. The clause provided:
The Employer shall not discharge any employee without just cause and
shall give at least one warning notice to the employee in writing of the com-
plaint. A copy of the warning notice must also be sent to the Union, except
that no warning notice need be given to the employee before he is dis-
charged if the cause of such discharge is dishonesty, major violation of the
company rules that do not conflict with this Agreement, or drinking while
on duty. Any employee may request an investigation as to his discharge and
should the investigation prove that an injustice has been done an employee,
he shall be reinstated and compensated at his usual rate of pay while he has
been out of work.
Id.
150. Id. at 422.
151. See id.
152. Id.; see also supra note 149 (pertinent text of collective bargaining agreement).
153. 700 F.2d at 422; see also supra note 149 (pertinent text of collective bargaining
agreement).
154. 700 F.2d at 422.
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ing to the employee's work record, which were offered by the com-
pany in lieu of testimony, and also refused to delay the hearing to
allow the company to produce witnesses in lieu of the letters.t55
Company representatives did, however, testify regarding the specific
violation considered by the arbitrator.156
On review, the court held that the arbitrator properly considered
two issues: whether the employee committed a major violation justi-
fying immediate discharge, and if not, whether the company gave a
prior written warning.t57 Considering these narrow issues, the court
stated that the employee's general work record was not crucial to the
arbitration proceeding.158 Thus, the arbitrator's refusal to consider
the employee's work record did not deprive the company of a funda-
mentally fair hearing.I59
The court concluded that the arbitrator's award was enforcea-
ble.160 According to the court, Grahams may have had proper cause
to discharge the employee. 161 The propriety of the discharge, how-
ever, was left to the arbitrator.162 The court stated that it would be
improper to interfere with the arbitrator's determination.163
Bell Aerospace and Grahams demonstrate how the section 10 stan-
dard of review may be applied to review of labor arbitration awards.
Both decisions analyze the arbitration proceedings to assure that
they were conducted fairly.164 This analysis varies from the Enterprise
Wheel standard which focuses solely on the arbitrator's award.165
III. THE ADOPTION OF SECTION 10 AS THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
LABOR ARBITRATION
A. Limitations of the Enterprise Wheel Standard
The primary problem in applying the Enterprise Wheel standard is
the type of analysis it requires. First, the court must review the col-
155. Id. at 422-23.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 422.
158. Id. at 423.
159. Id. (footnote omitted). Not all members of the court endorsed the applica-
tion of the Arbitration Act. The concurring opinion stated, "I would make it clear
that the Court is not squarely deciding the issue of whether the United States Arbitra-
tion Act applies to the review of labor arbitration awards, an issue on which courts
are presently divided." Id. at 424 (John Gibson, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 423.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See id.; Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923.
165. Compare Grahams, 700 F.2d at 422-23, and Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923, with
Lackawanna Leather Co., 706 F.2d at 230-32 and Litton, 704 F.2d at 395-99; see also supra
notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
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lective bargaining agreement.166 Second, the court must review the
arbitrator's opinion and award.167 Finally, the court must compare
the~collective bargaining agreement to the arbitrator's decision and
award to determine whether the award draws its essence from the
agreement. ' 6 8
The difficulty with the Enterprise Wheel analysis is that courts might
use the same analysis if they were allowed to review the arbitrator's
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 169 The logical
method for such a review would be for the court to read the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and the arbitrator's award. The court
would then compare the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement
with its own interpretation. If the court concluded that the arbitrator
incorrectly interpreted the agreement, the court would not enforce
the award. 170
The comparison of these two analytical processes reveals that the
Enterprise Wheel analysis is nearly identical to an impermissible review
of the merits.1 71 Both analyses require the court to compare the col-
lective bargaining agreement and the award. The factor which sepa-
rates the two is that in applying the Enterprise Wheel standard, the
reviewing court may not substitute its interpretation of the agree-
ment for the arbitrator's. 1 72 Nevertheless, this subtle distinction may
inadvertently lead to a review of the merits of the award. 17S
166. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 594-95.
167. See id at 597-98.
168. Id. at 597; see also Daniel Constr. Co., 738 F.2d at 300-01; Riceland Foods, 737
F.2d at 759-60; Siw-Me Power Corp., 715 F.2d at 1325-28; St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715
F.2d at 407-09; Lackawanna Leather, 706 F.2d at 230-32; Litton, 704 F.2d at 395-99;
Vulcan-Hart Corp., 671 F.2d at 1184-85.
169. The Enterprise Wheel Court seemed to recognize this similarity and cautioned
courts not to review the merits of the arbitrator's award. See 363 U.S. at 596, 599.
170. See infra note 173.
171. Kaden, supra note 2, at 270-71 (courts frequently review the merits).
172. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599.
173. Professor Kaden recognized this possibility in his comment on the Eighth
Circuit case, Truck Drivers & Helpers Union Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d
562 (8th Cir. 1964):
[Tihe Eighth Circuit concluded that an arbitrator lacked authority to mea-
sure the degree of discipline warranted by an infraction. The agreement
provided that the employer's disciplinary action could be reversed only if it
were found that the complaint was 'not supported by the facts, and that the
management ha[d] acted arbitrarily and in bad faith or in violation of the
express terms of this [a]greement.' Curiously, although the arbitrator had
accepted the factual basis advanced by the company for its action, the court
itself examined the reasons given for discharge. If the arbitrator was not
authorized to determine whether the discharge was arbitrary when the facts
showed an infraction, it is difficult to see why the court found a need to
explore the company's reason. On the other hand, if the court was testing
the arbitrator's determination of 'arbitrariness' in the manner of discipline,
its inquiry seems to have gone more to the merits of his award than to his
power to reach it.
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The language of Enterprise Wheel poses additional problems in ap-
plying the Enterprise Wheel standard. In several Eighth Circuit deci-
sions the court uses other language from Enterprise Wheel in an
attempt to clarify the standard.t74 This language, however, adds
nothing to the Enterprise Wheel analysis.' 75 To say that an arbitrator
may not "dispense his own brand of industrial justice" is to describe
an award that does not draw its essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement.' 76
B. Benefits of Section 10
The Enterprise Wheel standard makes no explicit provision for re-
view based on misconduct of the parties or the arbitrator. Yet an
award based on misconduct or fraud should not be allowed if the
integrity of arbitration is to be preserved. t77 In contrast, the Arbitra-
tion Act provides a basis for vacating an arbitration award if miscon-
duct is present.178 These standards are available and workable, as
the Eighth Circuit discovered in Grahams. 179
Kaden, supra note 2, at 271.
174. See Daniel Constr. Co., 738 F.2d at 301 ("The arbitrator stayed within the areas
marked out for his consideration"); St. Louis Theatrical Co., 715 F.2d at 407 ("When
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to his obligation, courts have no choice
but to refuse enforcement of the award").
175. By using the language of Enterprise Wheel, a court may state that "refusal of
courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitra-
tion under collective bargaining agreements." 363 U.S. at 596. At the same time,
"When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." Id. at 597. Yet, "so far as the arbi-
trator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business
overruling [the arbitrator] because their interpretation of the contract is different."
Id. at 599.
According to the Court, the role of the arbitrator is to "settle disputes at the
plant level--disputes that require for their solution knowledge of the custom and
practices of a particular factory or of a particular industry as reflected in the particu-
lar agreements." Id. at 596. Another case in the Steelworkers Trilogy comments:
"The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the
contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the industry and the shop-
is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it."
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581-82. Yet at the same time, "an arbitrator
. . . does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice." Enterprise Wheel, 363
U.S. at 597. Thus, depending on its philsophy regarding labor arbitration, a court
may use the language of the Steelworkers Trilogy to support a variety of results. This
problem is exacerbated by the endless variety of provisions in collective bargaining
agreements.
176. This language is part of the section that defines the parameters of the arbitra-
tor's power. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. The entire section emphasizes that
the arbitrator must interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement. See id
177. See infra note 194.
178. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(c).
179. Grahams, 700 F.2d at 422-23; see, e.g., Merit Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673; Middlesex
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Under section 10 of the Arbitration Act, the union or the company
may appeal if it believes it was denied a fundamentally fair hearing
because of fraud, partiality, or evidentiary error. 8 0 The aggrieved
party may claim that some specific behavior of the arbitrator was im-
proper and prejudiced its rights.' 8 ' The appellate court may focus
on the section 10 standard, relevant case law, and the arbitrator's
conduct in considering the appeal.18 2
In contrast, the Enterprise Wheel standard does not provide a proce-
dural basis for appeal.183 Instead of stating the procedural basis di-
rectly, a party is forced to argue that the award does not draw its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. The alleged de-
fect, however, may not appear on the face of the award. The award
may appear to be firmly based on the collective bargaining agree-
ment, yet the arbitrator may have had some business dealings with
one of the parties.184 If the relationship creates the appearance of
partiality the award should be vacated.185 Enterprise Wheel, however,
fails to expressly provide for this defect.18 6
Mut. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 1197; Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing,
Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979); Narragansett, 503 F.2d at 311-12; Bell Aero-
space, 500 F.2d at 923.
180. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)-(c).
181. See, e.g., Grahams, 700 F.2d at 422-23; Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 922-23.
182. See, e.g., Grahams, 700 F.2d at 422-23; Narragansett, 503 F.2d at 311-12.
183. But see Kaden, supra note 2, at 297.
184. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 147-50 (appearance of impropri-
ety established by failure to disclose business relationship justifies vacating the arbi-
trator's award).
185. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b).
186. While the spirit of Enterprise Wheel seems to indicate that misconduct should
not be tolerated, the cases do not formulate any helpful standards for reviewing mis-
conduct. Professor Kaden finds a "mandate acknowledged in Enterprise Wheel to pro-
tect the procedural integrity of the process by refusing enforcement of awards tainted
by partiality or corruption." Kaden, supra note 2, at 297.
The Court in Lincoln Mills could have compelled arbitration based on the Arbi-
tration Act, but it instead choose to apply § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448. The Court approved the construction of § 301 in
Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451. The American Thread court also commented on the role
of the Arbitration Act:
Defendant's final point is that this case cannot be sent to arbitration
because no arbitrator has been named . . . . But this defect can be and
should be cured by this Court adopting as a guiding analogy the practice
under § 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . . If the parties are unable
within ten days to agree upon an arbitrator, this Court will appoint one.
Plaintiff is directed to prepare a suitable decree adopting, whenever
practical, the forms and procedures which would be used if this case fell
within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act.
American Thread, 113 F. Supp. at 142.
One commentator stated that the Court's approval of the reasoning in American
Thread authorizes the use of the Arbitration Act as a "guiding analogy." 0. FAIR-
1014 (Vol. I11
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The section 10 standard of review is also consistent with the public
policy of arbitration. Arbitration, which provides a grievance proce-
dure, is crucial to the policy of preserving economic peace.' 8 7 In
order to encourage arbitration, the procedure must be fair. Other-
wise, parties would use economic warfare as a means of asserting
their claims.' 88 Thus, the section 10 review standard promotes the
public policy of arbitration by assuring a fundamentally fair
hearing. 189
Section 10 of the Arbitration Act encompasses the concerns of the
Enterprise Wheel Court. Section 10(d) mandates vacating an award
when the arbitrators exceed their powers, or when the award is am-
biguous.190 These are the identical concerns addressed by the Enter-
prise Wheel Court.' 9 1 In addition, when the Enterprise Wheel Court
concluded that the arbitrator's award was ambiguous, the Court re-
manded the award for clarification by the arbitrator.192 Section
10(e) provides for further arbitration when directed by the court.
Thus, a comparison between the Court's actions in Enterprise Wheel
and section 10(d) and (e) shows that the Arbitration Act could have
been the basis for the Enterprise Wheel decision.
WEATHER, supra note 2, at 3-4. This argument is supported by the Court's grant of
broad discretion to lower courts in creating substantive labor law. See Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. at 456-57. Lower courts should be guided by the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act and other express statutory mandates in creating federal labor law. Id. at
457. Absent express statutory guidance, courts should look to the policy of relevant
legislation and fashion an appropriate remedy. Id. Finally, the Court encouraged
"judicial inventiveness" in solving labor problems. Id.
187. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
188. See id. at 453-55.
189. See Grahams, 700 F.2d at 422-23; Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 922-23.
190. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d).
191. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597-99; see supra notes 21-29 and accompanying
text.
192. Id. at 599. Another question posed by Enterprise Wheel concerns what a court
should do with an unenforceable award. When an award fails to draw its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement, should the court vacate the objectionable
aspects of the award or modify the award? In St. Louis Theatrical Co., the Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court in partially setting aside the arbitrator's award. 715
F.2d at 409. Contra Riceland Foods, 737 F.2d at 760 (Eighth Circuit reversed district
court's enforcement of the arbitrator's award).
The case in Enterprise Wheel was remanded to the district court with instructions
for further arbitration to determine the amounts due the employees, which essen-
tially required further arbitration to resolve the ambiguity. 363 U.S. at 599. It fol-
lows that the Eighth Circuit should also send ambiguous awards back for further
arbitration. In Totem Marine, the arbitration panel exceeded its powers by awarding
damages that were not requested by the plaintiff, and by denying a fundamentally fair
hearing by receiving evidence ex parte. 607 F.2d at 651-53. The Totem Marine court
"vacate[d] the award without prejudice to the resubmission of the dispute between
the parties before a new arbitration panel." Id. at 653.
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C. Adoption of Section 10
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals should adopt the section 10
standard of review for application to appeals of labor arbitration
awards. Section 10 can be applied consistently with Enterprise Wheel
and provides procedural protections lacking in the Enterprise Wheel
standard.193 By adopting section 10, the public policy favoring arbi-
tration as the means for resolving labor disputes is served by enhanc-
ing the integrity of the arbitration process. 194
Lincoln Mills provides the requisite authority to adopt the section
10 standard of review.m05 Lincoln Mills encouraged courts to shape
substantive labor law by looking to analagous federal labor laws.196
The limitations of the Enterprise Wheel standard, together with the
benefits of section 10, justify reliance on the standard of review pro-
vided by section 10.197
By adopting section 10, the court's inquiry becomes specific:198
Was there substantial misconduct or evidentiary error which de-
prived a party of a fundamentally fair hearing?199 Is the award final
and definite?200 Did the arbitrators exceed their powers? 201 This
last question is difficult because it requires a comparison of the col-
lective bargaining agreement and the award, similar to the Enterprise
Wheel analysis.20 2 This problem can be overcome by applying the
section 10 standard progressively. If an award meets the procedural
requirements of section 10(a)-(c) and is definite, the award should be
presumed valid. Power to settle the grievance is vested with the arbi-
trator, not the courts. Thus, the award should be vacated because
the arbitrator exceeded his or her power only if the award manifests
complete disregard for the agreement. 20 3
193. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)-(c). For cases demonstrating how the procedural pro-
tections of § 10 can be applied to labor arbitration, see Grahams, 700 F.2d at 422-23;
Narrangansett, 503 F.2d at 312; Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923.
194. Even though arbitrators are selected because of their knowledge of the in-
dustry rather than procedure, they may err. By providing grounds for vacating an
award, Congress recognized that although the parties have chosen arbitration, the
procedures must not be entirely unchecked.
195. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 28; Pirsig, supra note 20, at 371-
72.
196. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
197. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 28; Pirsig, supra note 20, at 371-
72.
198. Markham, supra note 6, at 643.
199. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(c).
200. See id. § 10(d).
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
203. The Supreme Court stated that an arbitrator's decision in arbitrating a dis-
pute under the Securities Act of 1933 would not be subject to judicial review for
error unless the award was in manifest disregard of the law. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
1016 [Vol. I11
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By adopting section 10, the Eighth Circuit stands to gain several
benefits. Applying section 10 properly defines the role of the court
and the arbitrator. The essential elements of Enterprise Wheel will be
preserved and enhanced by providing procedural protections.204
The procedural emphasis of section 10 provides specific grounds for
appeal, which will benefit both the arbitration process and the
courts.20
5
CONCLUSION
Arbitration is the preferred method of resolving labor disputes.
The Enterprise Wheel standard, however, does not adequately serve
the public's interest in proper arbitration procedures. The standard
invites judicial intervention in the arbitration process and diminishes
the autonomy granted arbitration.
The section 10 standard of review provides for procedural review
of arbitrators' awards. By adopting this standard, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals would uphold the precedent of Enterprise Wheel and
further the public policy of arbitration. The standard of judicial re-
view provided by section 10 would enhance the focus in reviewing
arbitration awards and ultimately simplify the judicial task.
427, 436-37 (1953). The primary source of law in labor arbitration is the collective
bargaining agreement. Thus, manifest disregard of the collective bargaining agree-
ment would be an instance of the arbitrator exceeding his or her power. Due to the
public policy favoring arbitration, manifest disregard of the agreement should be the
only grounds for finding that the arbitrator exceeded his or her power.
204. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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